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I. Introduction

These thoughts were o{;;casioned by a question I was asked some
time back in an Ethics class. In course of a discussion of in vitro
fertilization (IVF), I made the comment that IVF seemed to reduce the
procreation of a human being to the making of a product. Consequent
on that, I continued, the relationship of parent to child was being
replaced by one more resembling that of producer to product, of maker
to something made -- indeed, of creator to creature. In other words, IVF
would be a real instance of "playing God". The question, which one of
my students asked innocently enough, was whether or not there were
"any studies to snow that" parents orIVF- chiidren played God overthem, any more than natural parents did over their children.
When I heard the question I was a bit nonplussed. I tried to
explain that this was not what I was talking about. I tried to explain that
rather than make such a study which, even presuming for the moment
its validity, might give us some statistical follow-up on IVF procedures,
my approach as a natural law ethicist was in the opposite direction. I
was not out to measure results in some utilitarian way. Rather I first
wanted to explore the reality of the act of IVF and, once having done
that,judge its morality. My aim was to think about the ontology of the
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situation, to ask if it implied a radically new relationship of producer to
product in place of the old one between parent and child. Yet, as I left
the classroom, I was not entirely satisfied with my answer. What
follows is a profile of my thoughts since then on in vitro fertilization
and related matters, thoughts which came again to mind after the
cloning of "Dolly." I

II. The Question of the Personal Reality of the Zygote
Let me state at the outset that the very fact of in vitro human
zygotes highlights the distinct and separate existence of the same.
Obviously, the zygote in vitro is not part of its mother, or of its "parent"
in the case of a clone. It is instead a whole, separate organism and it is
human, not in basic kind different from other humans at this stage of
their development. 2 The immediate and key question then concerns its
personal status. Is the zygote a person? And if it is, what difference
does that make? But first what is a person?

III. What is a Person? Personhood and Intelligence
If we speak of human persons, anyone can see that these must
be associated with, or even inextricably bound up with, being
intelligent. Because a human being is intelligent, he or she has the
characteristics we spontaneously associate with personhood. Because
a human being is intelligent, he can think and he can think upon his
thinking. Because a human being is intelligent, he can talk, which is to
say he can manage syntactical speech. Because a human being is
intelligent, he can express his thought not just in speech but also in
writing. Correspondingly, because he is intelligent he can read.
Because a human being is intelligent, he can laugh. Consider
for a moment that to smile at the most moronic pun needs an ability to
reflect on the fact that a single word can simultaneously bear two
meanings. Such a reflection, which in its own way transcends time and
space, is pre-eminently a function of immaterial intelligence. To be
sure, we may sometimes refer to animals or things as laughing or
smiling. On second thought, however, we know that in such references
we are using figures of speech. It is perfectly correct to speak of
laughing hyenas or smiling meadows, as long as we are aware of the
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metaphors involved in our speaking.
Because a human being is intelligent, he can enter that personto-person relationship which is love. More pointedly, he can love not
just in a selfish way, for his own gratification or utility. But he can,
instead, love another for that other's sake. Not slotted in to a simplistic
sense pleasure, a human being, because he is intelligent, can have an
expansive, altruistic, even God-imaging, love of benevolence.
In possession of intelligence, human beings can establish
societies, which are more than mere packs or herds. They can commit
themselves to marriages and form 'families, replete with love, mutual
respect, authority, traditions, and values. Beyond this, intelligent
human beings can and do b~ild cities, states, cultures and great
civilizations. In these one can find laws, courts, schools, and other
institutions, any of which would suffice to set human persons apart
from ali eise in the material world. 3
Because they are intelligent, human beings can note the passage
of time, as well as mark and record their history. At home and in
school, they can pass that history on from generation to generation. In
line with this, intelligent human beings can correct themselves and
make progress, both individually and in community with one another.
Because they are intelligent, human beings can reflect upon the
meaning of their lives. With Socrates they can agree that "the
unexamined life is not worth living. ,,4 Everywhere human beings can
meditate upon their origin and their destiny. Alone among all creatures
on earth they can and do have religion. 5 Indeed, even if they reject
religion and the examination of life itself, if their rejection is rational,
human beings evidence Aristotle's dictum: "Even if I choose not to
philosophize, I must philosophize. ,,6
Possessing mtelligence, human beings are able to range over a_
multitude of eligible goods and realize that none of them is so perfect
that it must be chosen without fail. For this reason, human beings,
unlike animals, insects, or plants, are not necessitated to act. They are
indeed what each of us experiences himself to be, namely, selfdetermined or free. That is to say, human beings, in possession of
intelligence, are in charge of themselves. They are, in this, able to set
goals or ends for themselves and to use other things as means to those
ends. So doing, they manifest their mastery over the order of means to
ends. And thus they show themselves, as Kant well understood, to be
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ends in themselves and never simply means. 7
This last is the foundation of human beings having rights. They
are ends in themselves, never to be used as means for or by others. And
others who act in an intelligent way ought to respect that and base their
conduct on it. Equally, this is the foundation of human beings having
responsibility, obligation, or duty. Because they are intelligent and in
charge of themselves, they have control over themselves and their
actions, and to that extent they are responsible for what they do. For
this reason, they are held to standards both by themselves and by other
human beings. In a word, we have here the basis for those distinctively
human and personal realities which are morality and law.
IV. Not the Exercise of Intelligence
Nevertheless, most people (certainly all who are in a universe
of moral discourse with me) will allow that persons exist even when
they are not exercising intellectual activity. Human beings may be
asleep. They may be unconscious; they may even be in prolonged
coma. They may be newborn or they may be old and senile. They may
be retarded or they may be insane. Still, most other people will
correctly see them as continuing persons and will accord them rights,
even though they will not ask them to assume duties. Personhood is
thus in everyday practice acknowledged as remaining even in the
absence of intellectual activity. Most certainly, a person is regarded not
as that activity itself (except in an indefensibly counter-intuitive
"stream of consciousness" view of personhood), but rather as the
enduring subject and source of such activity. Concretely, a person is
the continuing "self' which is the source of intellectual activity. This
self, even when it is not exercising intellectual activity, is still, from its
capacity or potency to give rise to such activity, correctly and
commonly said to be of intellectual nature.
V. Nature and Person
Reflecting on our own experience of ourselves, we are all aware
that this one same self which is the abiding subject and source of our
intellectual activity is also the subject and source of our bodily
activities as well. This is to say, right now, each of us experiences
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himself or herself to be one thing and one substrate source of both
intellectual and bodily activity. We experience this now and we also
remember it from past experience. This is why we accept responsibility
not just for our past and present thoughts but also for our freely chosen
bodily actions. This is also why we hold others responsible for all their
free activity, both past and present.
Involved with this are at least five concepts. The first is
"nature", the enduring source of a thing's activity, what Aristotle
describes as "the essence of things which have in themselves, as such,
a principle ofactivity."g The second is the common sense, Scholastic
notion that an essence or a nature can be (at least in part) known and
named from its activity inasmuch as "acting follows upon being" (agere
sequitur esse).9 Third is the realization that although human activity is
varied, especially as regards physical and mental, it all traces back to
one substrate sourCt:, which is the self. FOUI1:h is the ordinary practice
of defining things from their highest activity, e.g., plants from
vegetative life or animals from sensation. Connected with all four of
these is yet a fifth: that definition of "person" which is of oldest
continuous standing in the Western (and world) philosophical tradition.
Going back to Boethius (d. ca. 525 A.D.), this describes a person as "an
individual substance of rational nature." 10

VI. Unity Entailing Continuity and a Harder Question
Immediately based upon the underlying unity of the self, which
we can experience, there is a continuity between our intelligence and
sensation. Plato 11 and Descartes l2 notwithstanding, all human
intellectual activity begins and ends in sensation. While sensation and
intellection are not identical, we human beings never have thought
without sensation. J3 On its face, that may seem plausible enough,
particularly to people of Aristotelian or more broadly empirical bent.
But the really hard question, the one which immediately touches the
reality and the value of the unborn, including the zygote in a petri dish,
the newborn, the profoundly retarded, the Alzheimer's patient, and
others, is in the opposite direction. Can we ever have properly human
sensation, or properly human organic activity, without intelligence?
My first reply is affirmative. Yes, if we mean without the actual
exercise of intelligence. Examples could be multiplied. I have already
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spoken of persons asleep or in coma. Think beyond that only for a
moment about your own digestive functions, which are, right now
human and going on without your being in control of them or even for
the most part aware of them.
But can we ever have properly human sensation or organicactivity without the presence of the enduring subject and source of
intellectual activity? The answer to this is decidedly negative! Not as
long as we are talking about human organic activity. The bottom line
is this: In a human being there is only one enduring subject and source
of all of its activity. And that subject is properly called "intellectual"
from the highest activity to which it can give rise.
VII. Not an Angel on a Motorcycle
Now if at present we are just one single thing and if that single
thing, which is our "self', is of intellectual nature, the fact is that we
have always been that same one thing. There is not now, nor was there
ever in the past, any evidence to suggest that we are or have been two
things -- a kind of angel (a pure intelligence) riding a motorcycle (a
body).
Continuing with an imperfect analogy, let me observe that
immediate, present experience indicates that any imagined angel and
motorcycle would be facets of one and the same nature, self, or person.
Right now, even when we are not showing the "angelic" side of our
nature, it is nevertheless present in the reality of "the motorcycle". In
fact, that presence, through the unitary self, is what ultimately makes
the living human organism different from a motorcycle or from any
other machine.
But staying with the analogy, sputtering though it is, let me say
that it is beyond dispute that the "motorcycle" (that is the body which
each of us now is [and not just has]) existed intact before the exercise
of angel-like intellection. Moreover, it is beyond dispute that it was the
exact same identical motorcycle that it is now. More properly, this is
to say that a single same whole organism, recognizable as biologically
human, existed prior to any exercise of intellectual activity and
continues to exist now.
Furthermore, it is this same whole organism which is now in
each of us to be identified as the unitary subject and source of all
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human activities, organic, sensitive, and intellectual. In sum, we
ourselves, our same still imperfect selves, have existed continuously
from our conception, the first moment of our organic existence, right
up to the present time. And if we are persons now, we have always
been persons. We have indeed always been, basically if not
phenomenally, the same imperfect persons we are now.
Once again, what this means is that the one underlying subject
of all our present activities, intellectual and sensitive, as well as merely
organic, existed from the beginning even though we were not then -- as
we are not now -- acting in every way we ever would act. Looked at
from a slightly different angle, none of us has ever been any other kind
of thing from what we are now. Right now we are persons. Right now
we are individuals of a certain nature, which from its highest
manifestation is properly called rational or intellectual. We have never
been anything else. We have never been radishes. turnips, fish,
monkeys, or mere "protoplasm." From our conception we have been
human, which is to say, our own human selves and nothing but our
human selves.

VII. Alternative Thoughts
Were one to think otherwise, for example, that at some time
after the motorcycle was fully made or manufactured, some angel
person came to ride it, the obvious question would be, where did it
come from? Or by what agency did it come? Evidently not from the
previously existing body, for in this view that body (like the
motorcycle) would be of a different and inferior nature from the person
who (like the angel) would come to ride it. Not from the air surely?
Perhaps rrom Goc:l?- I fur one would not-deny-go~s power to interven=e~_-I
in His creation. But, employing Ockham's razor,14 I think it
unreasonable to multiply such interventions without necessity. I further
find it hard to suppress a wry smile at the thought that in the advent
(perhaps at birth?) of every human person there is a Divine intervention
of this character. Could that be something known, say, only to
advocates of partial birth abortions?
I think this unlikely. While I have no problem with God's
intervention in the creation of each human person, I see no reason to
understand it as putting a quasi-angel into an already fully formed body.
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Instead, the facts point in another direction. For from the moment of
its conception, in truth, a living human organism of a single nature
builds itself up in myriads of ways, psychically as well as organically.
This buildup essentially from within, if it is otherwise unimpeded, will
culminate in intellectual and also affective activity. Indeed, it will
culminate in all the personal activity, and more besides, of which I
spoke earlier.
Returning to our admittedly poor analogy of an angel riding a
motorcycle, let me make one more point. All too frequently, a view
which regards personhood as coming at some later stage of
development fails to distinguish between the growth of any living
organism and the fabrication of a machine. Organisms grow from
within, machines are fabricated from outside. To follow this, one need
only contrast the coming to be of a rose from its bud with the coming
to be of, say, a clock, part after part from without.
The important fact, once more, is that all human growth,
including bodily as well as intellectual development, inasmuch as it is
the growth from within of a single self of intellectual nature, is at every
stage from conception on, beyond any reasonable doubt, personal. The
distillate from all of this is that persons exist at all stages of human
development. Likewise, persons exist at all stages of human decline.
Moreover, at all stages, just as little persons do not differ in kind from
big persons and young persons do not differ in kind from old persons,
their value is not different in kind. Concurrently, their rights should not
differ in basic kind. 15 This is so even though obviously they will and
they must differ in degree and in accord with persons' conditions and
circumstances.
IX. In Vitro Fertilization

Returning now to in vitro fertilization, including the cloning of
human beings, the basic question is whether it is morally right to bring
a person into existence by such a procedure. Before answering, let me
first explain that I have no qualms about bringing lower animals, Dolly
for instance, into existence in this or a comparable way. Lacking the
activities and characteristics enumerated above, such animals are not
persons. Contrary to the prevailing Zeitgeist, they have no rightsl 6 and
I see no problem about their being used as means for someone else's
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end. 17 The question is about using persons -- ends in themselves and
never simply means. Is it morally right to bring them into existence in
the isolation of a petri dish?
In this connection, I want specially to note that the issue of
isolation relates to the question of the natural character of human
society, starting with the inherently social character of natural
procreation and the nuclear family itself. Alone in its earliest state,
whose child will or should the zygote in vitro be? Who should be
responsible for it? Who immediately should assume the task of caring
for it, and later educating it? These are not idle questions. They relate
to the reality of a human person, which would be present in vitro.

X. Wont Case Scenarios
If We are talking about the simple, detached, objective
laboratory production of a zygote, it might seem that none of these
questions would arise. The isolation mentioned might simply be
accepted, or even required by proper scientific and experimental
practices. But then, of course, the fundamental issue would remain: can
it be morally acceptable to reduce the human person to a mere thing, a
simple laboratory specimen? The answer should by now be plain.
"Science without conscience can only lead to man's ruin."ls And: "No
biologist or doctor can reasonably claim, by virtue of his scientific
competence, to be able to decide on people's origin and destiny."19
If we are talking about a zygote or embryo in vitro, which is
made to be manipulated, to be frozen and thawed, to be bought and
sold, for the benefit of others, again questions relate to the reality of a
human person. At a minimum we can say that the responsibilities of
others are not clearly assigned. But more than-this, it woulclbe a patent
understatement to say that for such embryos very important things,
which go right to the core of human personhood, as well as to personto-person relationships, would be lacking. And that lack could only be
seen as an injustice committed against incipient persons. 20

XI. Cloning and a Best Case Scenario
But now consider a futuristic human cloning in which only a
single progenitor would be involved, a progenitor claiming an absolute
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right to his body and to his own replication. Or again consider, what is
perhaps a best Case21 -- a man and wife, respectively contributing sperm
and ovum, no donors, no surrogates (paid or unpaid), no
experimentation, no freezing, and with implantation of every zygote"in
the wife's womb. What moral objection could anyone have in either
case?
Utilitarians would probably have none. Indeed, strong
utilitarians would have few or no objections to even the worst cases.
For them the end result of happy, fulfilled, parents or progenitors would
justify almost any means. For non-utilitarian moralists, however,
especially those of natural law personalist variety, this kind of
justification will not suffice. Good results or increased happiness alone
will not justify some action which is morally unacceptable to begin
with.
The exact question then is: in an instance of human cloning, or
even in the best case scenario, is IVF morally right or wrong? And
whichever it is, for what precise reason is it so? My first inclination is
to reply that it would still be morally wrong, for the reason that the
offspring would be exposed most likely (or even if only possibly) to
increased risk of physical harm, as compared to a normally conceived
child, and this would be not for its own benefit (unlike risk in other
medical interventions) but primarily, if not exclusively, for the benefit
of others.
This, of course, relates to the development of IVF techniques
and issues which can be separated from IVF itself -- such as the
destruction of imperfect or superfluous zygotes prior to implantation,
or the abortion of others after successful implantings, or the intent to
abort imperfect fetuses, or any concomitant fetal experimentation. But
suppose, as in the just mentioned best case, that all these things would
be behind us (in contrast with the days of Steptoe and Edwards
squashing and flushing their rejects or the 276 failures before the
advent of Dolly22). Could we then simply sit back and enjoy the
benefits of in vitro fertilization without any moral issue arising?
I think not. That is, not if we are going to take our moral
bearings from a real natural order, which exists anterior to any action
of ours. There is still the physical separation from parents for the in
vitro offspring. That has to be seen as something not natural, and as
thus entailing a burden of justification -- inasmuch as we are talking not
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about the production of an animal but of a person. Moreover, that
justification cannot be offered in terms of the benefit that is in the
action for others; persons are never simply for the benefit of others.
Nor do even married parents, much less any others in the bizarre
generation of clones, possess an absolute right to have children. 23
But neither can justification be offered (for a present IVF
procedure) in terms of future benefits which may accrue to the still
non-existent person to be conceived in vitro. To clarify this, let me say
that "the still non-existent person" relates to its status prior to
conception. For after conception has occurred, even though there is no
manifestation of the higher activities we associate with persons,
nevertheless, because of the enduring unitary reality of every human
being, personhood is present. The point, made above, is that
experience does not support a dualist conception of a human being.
The body, from its inception, is part of the one human being and shares
in human personal reality.
XII. Natural Law and Biology

Something to emphasize here is the nuanced connection
between the natural law and biology. We must avoid an excessive
"biologism" of the sort implied in the ancient Stoic conception of
natural law as a kind of attunement with nature at large. 24 But at the
same time, even as we stress the personal character of natural law and
morality, we should remember that personal for human beings includes
corporeal. Because of this, and to avoid some sort of entirely notional
conception of morality, we cannot be indifferent to the kind of markers
of what is natural versus unnatural which biology furnishes. While we
do not want to reduce personal to biolegic-al, we also do not want to
oppose them. A person is not an angel enclosed in an impersonal,
ultimately mechanistic, and inimical body.
This last goes back even to the question of the separation of the
unitive and procreative aspects of human generation which is involved
in in vitro fertilization.25 While stress on both aspects together may
seem to some to be "biologistic", if one looks at the matter from the
viewpoint of a unified human nature, the biological norm -- far from
being extrinsically introduced from some impersonal objective realm
of science -- becomes an intrinsic, and personal, guide to what is
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natural versus unnatural.
Returning then to the original remark I made in class, a central
problem I have with all in vitro fertilization is that in its rejection of
biological norms, its separation of the unitive and procreative aspects
ofhwnan generation, its necessary isolation of the child from a mother
and father, its consideration of the child only or primarily in view of
others' purposes or desires, it has arbitrarily established a new
relationship between the child and its progenitors. Floating free from
any biological norm, the progenitors of an in vitro hwnan being asswne
a dominance over it, and the natural order of which it is a part, which
is closer to that of a creator over its creature than to that of a parent
over his child. For their own greater glory, they are acting as to imply
that they are owners of the in vitro person in a way that no natural
parent owns his child. Even in the absence of "studies" of later
behavior of parents toward their born children, the point I was making
is that the relationship itself has radically changed. And no one can be
indifferent to this change when questions of morality arise.
XIII. Finally

,~

A final point is this. If one can ignore biological markers at the
start of life, if one can replace them at will, and with that assert the
dominance of one's own will over the natural order, why cannot the
same be done at the end of life? If one has total freedom to effect the
advent of a zygote, apart from any natural order, why would one not
have the same freedom a moment later to effect its demise? If there's
nothing in the nature of things to constrain or limit the will to power at
the first moment, what can be said against squashing and flushing
"rejects" at any subsequent moment? Indeed, what can be said against
anyone with power simply using it to eliminate any other person at any
stage of development?
Perhaps you will reply that while I may be free in the first
moment I am not equally free in the next, because by my action I have
assumed a new responsibility. Analogous situations can be imagined.
Thus I may be free to marry or not to marry, but once I marry I am no
longer simply free to leave my wife. I would answer, why not? For
without some appeal to a nature of things (involving biological realities
as norms), I would seem to be quite free . I can at will take something
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or leave it, which is in fact exactly where many (most?) people are with
respect to marriage and other moral realities. In this, however, against
their own better nature, they are living by the maxim of tyrants: "let my
will suffice for a reason" (sit pro ratione voluntas mea).26
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